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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Michael sat silently as he waited for his name to be called. This was 
not his first time appearing before a judge. Michael had been arrested 
multiple times before for getting into arguments with and hitting his wife.1 
The last time he was in court, he was charged with fifth-degree misdemeanor 
assault and the judge issued a criminal No Contact Order stating he could not 
have any contact with his wife.2 Nevertheless, Michael went to his wife’s 
apartment a couple months after the conviction. The police were called, and 
Michael was arrested for violating the No Contact Order.3  
Michael did not understand the severity of violating a No Contact 
Order. Expecting to be charged with a misdemeanor crime, he was shocked 
when the judge announced that he was being indicted with a felony charge of 
violating a No Contact Order.4 Before Michael could question the judge, the 
court set bail and issued yet another No Contact Order.5 Michael, confused 
by what had just occurred, signed the new No Contact Order and was 
escorted back to his jail cell.6  
Michael is convinced that his constitutional rights have been 
infringed upon. Michael alleges the No Contact Order statute is facially 
invalid because it violates the due process clause of both the United States 
Constitution and Minnesota State Constitution.7 How should the district 
court rule? 
                                                          
1 See infra text accompanying notes 98–113 (providing the factual background 
of Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177).  
2 See infra text accompanying notes 99–100 (stating the criminal charges giving 
rise to the first Domestic Abuse No Contact Order (DANCO)).  
3 See infra text accompanying notes 106–107 (describing the circumstances 
underlying the first DANCO violation). 
4 See infra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining why the first DANCO 
violation was elevated to a felony offense). 
5 See infra text accompanying note 110 (mentioning the issuance of the second 
DANCO).  
6 See infra text accompanying note 111 (describing the procedural process 
followed in the issuance of the second DANCO). 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 114–115 (stating Ness’s arguments 
challenging the constitutionality of MINN. STAT. § 629.75).  
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In State v. Ness, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently upheld the 
constitutionality of Minnesota Statute § 629.75.8 The statute grants courts the 
authority to issue a Domestic Abuse No Contact Order (DANCO) against a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding involving domestic abuse, harassment, 
stalking, violation of an existing order for protection, or violation of a prior 
DANCO.9 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected appellant Bryan Paul 
Ness’s arguments that the DANCO statute failed to provide adequate notice 
and opportunity to be heard and encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.10 The court concluded that a defendant’s procedural due 
process rights are not violated when a DANCO is issued in conjunction with 
a pretrial hearing because the pretrial hearing satisfies the DANCO statute’s 
hearing requirement.11 Furthermore, the court found that sufficient checks on 
judicial discretion exist to eliminate the potential for arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement of the DANCO statute.12  
Despite Ness, Minnesota district courts still face uncertainty when 
interpreting or applying the DANCO statute.13 Before Ness, no uniform 
interpretation or application of the DANCO statute among the Minnesota 
district courts existed.14 Even after Ness, uncertainties remain because the 
Minnesota legislature has yet to provide clear guidance to courts specifying 
under what circumstances a court should issue a DANCO.15 This Note will 
                                                          
8 Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 186 (providing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in 
Ness).  
9 See MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(a) (2013) (also referred to as the 
“DANCO statute”). A DANCO may also be issued against a juvenile offender in a 
delinquency proceeding for domestic abuse, harassment or stalking, violation of an order for 
protection, or violation of a prior DANCO. Id. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 131–134 (explaining the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s reasoning for upholding the constitutionality of the DANCO statute).  
11 See infra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s emphasis on the DANCO statute’s language as evidence of adequate procedural due 
process).  
12 See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (noting the limitations 
imposed by the DANCO statute on judicial discretion).  
13 See infra Part IV.C (exploring the uncertainty faced by district courts imposing 
DANCOs).  
14 See infra note 118 and accompanying text (mentioning the lack of legislative 
guidance and standards for district courts). See also Dan Gunderson, Law Protecting Domestic 
Abuse Victims Challenged in State Supreme Court, MPR NEWS (Nov. 9, 2012), available at 
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2012/11/09/law/state-supreme-court-
constitutionality-domestic-abuse-no-contact-order (noting that Minnesota district courts 
routinely approved DANCOs in domestic abuse cases until Ness’s appeal when some district 
courts began to refuse to issue or enforce DANCOs); MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, 
MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION GRANT APPLICATION: MINNESOTA COALITION FOR 
BATTERED WOMEN 3 (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.mnbar.org/barfoundation/ 
Meeting%20Notices/062813/9%20-%20Minnesota%20Coalition%20for%20Battered%20 
Women,%20Inc..pdf (“Challenges to the DANCO statute have been routine in District Court 
over the past year resulting in confusion and lack of enforcement of orders.”).  
15 See State v. Yang, No. A11-1377, 2013 WL 4779014, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Sept. 9, 2013) (noting the broad discretion afforded district courts in issuing a DANCO). 
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examine the impact of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ness on 
criminal defendants’ rights in DANCO proceedings. Part II of this Note 
provides an overview of the development of domestic violence law in 
Minnesota and describes the various civil and criminal domestic violence 
statutes enacted in Minnesota.16 Part III introduces the underlying facts of 
Ness and examines the reasoning of the district and appellate courts.17  
Part IV argues that while the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding 
that the DANCO statute facially provides for adequate notice and 
opportunity to be heard was ultimately proper, criminal defendants may still 
bring as-applied constitutional challenges against the DANCO statute.18 
Further, Part IV contends that the lack of Minnesota legislative guidance on 
the issuance of DANCOs does, in part, encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.19 In order to remedy this, Part IV recommends 
that the Minnesota legislature amend the DANCO statute to clarify when and 
how a DANCO should be issued.20  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
Domestic violence statutes are a relatively recent legal 
development.21 During the 1970s, public awareness of domestic abuse grew, 
and women’s rights advocates began to push for legal intervention in 
domestic violence cases.22 In response to significant social pressure, state and 
federal legislatures began enacting domestic violence legislation.23 
                                                          
16 See infra Part II (defining domestic abuse and comparing Minnesota’s 
domestic violence statutes). 
17 See infra Part III (providing the facts triggering Ness’s DANCOs and 
discussing the district and appellate courts’ contrasting interpretations of procedural due 
process). 
18 See infra Part IV.A (asserting that not all criminal defendants will be afforded 
sufficient due process).  
19 See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the lack of explicit standards renders the 
DANCO statute vague). 
20 See infra Part IV.C (suggesting the Minnesota legislature amend the DANCO 
statute to provide further guidance to courts in interpreting and applying the DANCO statute).  
21 See Christine O’Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the 
Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 938 (1999) (providing a review of the 
development of domestic violence law in the United States).  
22 Id. at 938–39 (noting the shift in social perceptions of domestic violence). See 
also Nichole Miras Mordini, Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An 
Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 295–96, 
307–09 (2004) (describing the history of the American battered women’s movement); 
Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An 
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993) (discussing the 
motivations behind domestic violence legal reform efforts). 
23 See Mordini, supra note 22, at 317 (noting the social perceptions surrounding 
domestic violence).  Historically, domestic violence was socially and legally viewed as a 
private matter, outside the concerns and reach of the public law. Id. As a result, it took 
decades for women’s and victims’ rights advocates to combat the stereotypes surrounding 
domestic violence and to pressure state legislatures to create laws addressing it. Id. at 317–18. 
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Minnesota was among the first states to enact domestic violence legislation, 
codifying its first laws in 1979.24 The Minnesota legislature has periodically 
revised and updated its domestic violence laws to ensure that the laws 
effectively protect victims of domestic violence.25 
 
A. Defining Domestic Abuse 
 
A single definition is incapable of capturing the diversity of 
domestic abuse and domestic violence.26 As a result, there is often a 
disconnect between victims’ experiences of domestic violence and the law.27 
Minnesota broadly defines domestic violence and domestic abuse in an effort 
to ensure victims’ experiences align with the text of the law.28 Under 
Minnesota law, “domestic abuse” is defined as:  
 
the following, if committed against a family or household 
member by a family or household member: (1) physical 
harm, bodily injury, or assault; (2) the infliction of fear of 
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or (3) 
                                                          
24 See Shannon M. Heim, Revisions to Minnesota Domestic Violence Law Affords 
Greater Protection to Vulnerable Victims, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 950, 955 (2011) 
(discussing the legislative history of Minnesota’s domestic violence statutes). Minnesota’s 
Domestic Abuse Act, MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, was codified into law on May 25, 1979. Laws 
of Minnesota for 1979, Chapter 214–H.F. No. 521, 1979 Leg., 71st Sess. 414, 417 (Minn. 
1979), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/law/1979/0/1979-214.pdf (stating 
the Domestic Abuse Act’s codification date). The original Domestic Abuse Act statute stated 
that it was an act “relating to domestic abuse; authorizing judicial intervention to provide 
protection from abuse; prescribing penalties.” Id. at 414 (detailing the purpose and scope of 
the Domestic Abuse Act).  
25 Heim, supra note 24, at 955–56 (noting the evolution of Minnesota’s domestic 
violence laws). Since 1979, the Minnesota legislature has amended the Domestic Abuse Act to 
expand its scope, provide stricter penalties for violations, and afford an additional, criminal 
basis for protection. Id.  
26 See Mordini, supra note 22, at 300 (remarking on the diversity of domestic 
abuse definitions); Klein & Orloff, supra note 22, at 810 (noting that domestic violence “is an 
exceedingly complex problem, presenting many unique challenges”). For example, many 
service providers and counseling programs broadly define domestic abuse to include both 
physical and psychological abuse. Mordini, supra note 22, at 300–01. Conversely, some state 
statutes exclude relationships where no physical violence or threat of bodily harm has 
occurred. Id. 
27 Mordini, supra note 22, at 300–01 (discussing the differences between 
advocates’ definitions of domestic abuse and battery and the legal definitions). 
28 Unlike some state statutes, Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act does not require 
physical violence in order for domestic abuse to have occurred. See generally Mordini, supra 
note 22, at 300–01 (providing examples of non-inclusive legal definitions of domestic abuse, 
such as statutes that require physical violence or threat of bodily harm occur in order for an act 
to be classified as domestic abuse). This allows more victims of domestic violence to seek 
legal protection from their abusers. Id. As a result, Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act is a 
positive example for other states in drafting the language for domestic violence laws. Heim, 
supra note 24, at 953 (noting that academics and lawmakers look to Minnesota law for a 
positive example of domestic violence laws).  
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terroristic threats . . . criminal sexual conduct . . . or 
interference with an emergency call.29  
 
Additionally, Minnesota’s definition of “family or household members” 
encompasses not only individuals related to one another but also persons 
who have resided together in the past or are involved in a significant 
romantic or sexual relationship with one another.30 This Note will use the 
broad definition of domestic abuse encompassed in the Minnesota Domestic 
Abuse Act.31  
 
B. Minnesota’s Domestic Violence Statutes 
 
 Minnesota’s domestic violence legislation consists of three statutes, 
two civil and one criminal.32 Each of these statutes provides a separate basis 
                                                          
29 MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 2(a) (2013) (providing Minnesota’s legal 
definition of domestic abuse). The Domestic Abuse Act cross-references the definitions of 
terroristic threats, criminal sexual conduct, and interference with an emergency call with other 
Minnesota statute provisions. Id. Those provisions are: MINN. STAT. § 609.713, subdiv. 1  
(2013) (providing the meaning of terroristic threats); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342, 609.344, 
609.345, and 609.3451 (2013) (defining criminal sexual conduct); and MINN. STAT. § 609.78, 
subdiv. 2 (2013) (stating what constitutes interference with an emergency call). Id. “Physical 
harm, bodily injury, and assault” include hitting, kicking, slapping, pushing, and stabbing. See 
Minnesota Judicial Branch, Court Forms, Instructions to Apply for an OFP, *1–2 (2013), 
available at http://www.mncourts.gov/forms/public/forms/Domestic_Abuse/Order_for_ 
Protection/OFP101.pdf (providing examples of the types of acts that constitute domestic 
abuse). “Fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” includes verbal threats to 
kill, break bones, or threats to harm someone with a knife or gun. Id. “Criminal sexual 
conduct” includes forced sex or forced contact with intimate body parts. Id. “Interference with 
an emergency call” includes intentionally interrupting or preventing someone from placing an 
emergency call. Id. A six year statute of limitations applies to acts that meet the definition of 
domestic abuse. MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(10) (2013). 
30 MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 2(b) (noting the scope of Minnesota’s 
Domestic Abuse Act). The Domestic Abuse Act defines “family or household members” to 
mean:  
(1) spouses and former spouses; (2) parents and children; (3) persons 
related by blood; (4) persons who are presently residing together or who 
have resided together in the past; (5) persons who have a child in common 
regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any 
time; (6) a man and a woman if the woman is pregnant and the man is 
alleged to be the father, regardless of whether they have been married or 
lived together at any time; and (7) persons involved in a significant 
romantic or sexual relationship.  
Id. 
31 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining why Minnesota’s 
Domestic Abuse Statute is a positive example of domestic violence laws).  
32 See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4 (providing for a civil Order for 
Protection); MINN. STAT. § 609.748 (2013) (establishing a civil Harassment Restraining 
Order); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 22 (affording for a criminal Domestic Abuse No 
Contact Order). MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 22 was repealed by the Minnesota 
Legislature in 2010 and replaced by MINN. STAT. § 629.75, the current DANCO statute. Laws 
of Minnesota for 2010, Chapter 299–S.F. No. 2437 1, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess., at 1 (Minn. 
6
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for a court to intervene and protect victims of domestic violence.33 The 
Minnesota legislature has steadily strengthened its domestic violence laws 
over the past decade, imposing harsher criminal penalties on abusers while 
improving protections for victims.34  
 
1. Order for Protection 
 
 A civil Order for Protection (OFP) is an important judicial tool for 
protecting victims of domestic violence.35 OFPs allow victims of domestic 
abuse, as well as the victims’ families or household members, to petition a 
civil court for a protective order against their abusers.36 An OFP is a court 
order forbidding the abuser from physically harming or causing fear of 
immediate physical harm to the victim of domestic abuse.37 A court does not 
automatically grant OFPs; generally, in order to receive an OFP, the victim 
(or victim’s family or household member) must file a petition with the court 
and attend a judicial hearing.38 The petition must allege the existence of 
                                                                                                                                         
2010), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/law/2010/0/2010-299.pdf 
(describing the law as “[a]n act . . . recodifying and clarifying the domestic abuse no contact 
order law”). 
33 Heim, supra note 24, at 962 (“[O]rders for protection and no contact orders 
represent some of the most important opportunities to shield victims of domestic violence.”). 
Civil protective orders are issued at a petitioner’s request through a civil court process. State 
v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177 (2013). 
Conversely, criminal protective orders are issued by a court against a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding. Id. This distinction was very important to both the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 
and Minnesota Supreme Court’s analyses of whether MINN. STAT. § 629.75 provided adequate 
notice and opportunity to be heard. Id. at 223, 226. See also Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 184. 
34 Heim, supra note 24, at 956 (noting the evolution of Minnesota’s domestic 
abuse statutes).  
35 Klein & Orloff, supra note 22, at 811 (noting the importance of court 
intervention in protecting domestic violence victims).  
36 MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4(a) (stating who may file an OFP petition). 
See Rebecca Pirius, Minn. House of Representatives, Domestic Abuse Laws in Minnesota: An 
Overview, *4 (2012), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/domabuse.pdf 
(discussing the scope of an OFP). In an OFP proceeding, the court may issue an order 
(1) restraining the abusing party from committing acts of domestic violence; (2) excluding the 
abusing party from the dwelling that the parties share or from the residence of the petitioner; 
(3) requiring the abusing party participate in treatment or counseling services; (4) prohibiting 
the abusing party from contacting the petitioner in person, by phone, mail, email, or 
messaging, through a third-party, or by any other means; and (5) imposing, in its discretion, 
other relief it deems necessary for the protection of a family or household member. See MINN. 
STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 6(a) (listing the type of relief a court may grant in an OFP 
proceeding).  
37 Pirius, supra note 36, at *4 (describing the purpose of an OFP).  
38 See Minnesota Judicial Branch, Sixth Judicial District, Carlton County, Filing 
for an Order for Protection (OFP): How to Obtain an Order for Protection (2013), available 
at http://www.mncourts.gov/district/6/?page=1575 [hereinafter Filing for an OFP] (noting 
that a petition must be filed with the court in order for an OFP to be issued). Not all cases 
require a judicial hearing be held. Id. A hearing is only required if a party or the court requests 
one be held. Id. 
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domestic abuse, as defined by Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act, and be 
accompanied by an affidavit stating the specific facts and circumstances 
from which judicial relief is sought.39 The petitioner must also state whether 
she or he has ever had an OFP in effect against the alleged abuser.40 
Domestic violence advocates often assist victims of domestic violence with 
the legal process of obtaining an OFP.41 
The petitioner has two options once the petition is filed.42 The 
petitioner may request the issuance of an ex parte order, which is a 
temporary protective order.43 An ex parte order restricts the alleged abuser’s 
access to the victim during the adjudication process and is effective upon 
notice and service of the order on the alleged abuser (respondent).44 The ex 
parte order, however, is limited in scope.45 A more permanent OFP is 
required when a petitioner seeks relief beyond the scope of the ex parte 
order.46  
                                                          
39 MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4(b) (listing the OFP petition requirements). 
40 MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4(c) (imposing an additional requirement that 
a petitioner must satisfy before an OFP will be issued).  
41 Klein & Orloff, supra note 22, at 843–46 (noting that there has been an 
increase in the need for legal assistance in the form of battered women’s advocates because 
the majority of protective order petitioners are pro se).  
42 Filing for an OFP, supra note 38 (describing the OFP petition process). A 
petitioner may request a temporary OFP be issued in lieu of, or in addition to, a permanent 
OFP. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv.5 (providing for a temporary OFP). 
43 Filing for an OFP, supra note 38 (defining an ex parte order). To obtain an ex 
parte order, the petitioner must successfully allege an immediate and present danger of 
domestic abuse. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 7(a). See also Theresa A. Capistrant & 
Rebecca Wong, Orders for Protection: When the Shield Becomes a Sword, 65 BENCH & BAR 
MINN., Mar. 2008, available at http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2008/mar08/ofp.htm 
(discussing the process of obtaining an ex parte OFP and its effects on alleged abusers). 
44 Filing for an OFP, supra note 38 (stating the type of relief granted by an ex 
parte order).  
45 Minnesota Judicial Branch, Second Judicial District, Ramsey County, OFP 
FAQs: What Happens at Court? (2013), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/ 
district/2/?page=1173 [hereinafter OFP FAQs] (noting the differences between an ex parte 
order and a permanent OFP). An ex parte order may only grant relief by: (1) restraining the 
abusing party from committing acts of domestic abuse; (2) excluding the abusing party from 
the dwelling that the parties share or from the residence of the petitioner; (3) excluding the 
abusing party from petitioner’s place of employment; (4) ordering the abusing party to have 
no contact with the petitioner; (5) continuing all currently available insurance coverage; and 
(6) providing for the care and treatment of animals owned by the parties. MINN. STAT. 
§ 518B.01, subdiv. 7(a). If an ex parte order has been issued and the petitioner seeks only the 
relief provided under MINN. STAT. §518B.01, subdiv. 7, then no hearing is required unless the 
court declines to order the requested relief or one of the parties requests a hearing. MINN. 
STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 5(a)–(b). If no hearing is required or requested, the ex parte order is 
effective for a fixed period of time, as determined by the court or until modified by the court 
pursuant to a judicial hearing. MINN. STAT. §518B.01, subdiv. 7(c). See also MINN. STAT. 
§518B.01, subdiv. 6(b) (“[A]ny relief granted by an order for protection may be for a period 
not to exceed two years, except when the court determines a longer period is appropriate.”).  
46 OFP FAQs, supra note 45 (noting when a permanent OFP is required). A 
hearing may be requested by either the petitioner or respondent, ordered by the judge, or 
required by the court if relief requested includes child support or spousal maintenance, 
8
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The second option is to request an OFP at a judicial hearing. At the 
judicial hearing, both the petitioner and respondent are afforded an 
opportunity to speak on their behalf.47 The respondent is given the option of 
admitting to the alleged domestic abuse, denying abuse occurred but 
agreeing to the order, or denying abuse occurred and requesting an 
evidentiary hearing.48 Both parties may present evidence and witness 
testimony supporting their position at the evidentiary hearing.49 The judge 
will then evaluate the evidence and render a decision.50 If the judge finds 
domestic abuse occurred, an OFP will be entered against the respondent.51 
Violation of an OFP is subject to criminal penalties.52 A court may also issue 
a DANCO against a defendant in a criminal proceeding for violation of an 
OFP.53  
 
                                                                                                                                         
custody, treatment or counseling, restitution, or a distance provision. Id. The hearing must 
occur within fourteen days from the date it was requested or ordered. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, 
subdiv. 5(a) (stating a specific period of time in which an OFP judicial hearing must occur).  
47 OFP FAQs, supra note 45 (discussing the OFP judicial hearing).  
48 Capistrant & Wong, supra note 43 (listing the choices a respondent has to 
choose from at the OFP judicial hearing).  
49 OFP FAQs, supra note 45 (noting that both parties are afforded an opportunity 
to be heard). 
50 Id. (stating that the court considers all evidence presented before issuing an 
OFP). A district court must find probable cause that abuse occurred in order to issue an OFP. 
Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 184 (citing Vogt v. Vogt, 455 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Minn. 1990) (noting 
that the issuance of an OFP implies the court found probable cause of physical abuse)). 
Minnesota case law has established a broad range of acts that may warrant an OFP. Klein & 
Orloff, supra note 22, at 848 (citing Knuth v. Knuth, No. C1-92-482, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 
696, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 19, 1992) (holding that the Domestic Abuse Act does not 
require an overt physical act occur to support issuance of a protection order, and noting that 
past abusive behavior is a factor in determining cause for an order for protection)). Those acts 
include not only overt physical acts but also verbal threats to inflict fear of imminent physical 
harm. Id. 
51 OFP FAQs, supra note 45 (discussing when an OFP will be issued). The OFP 
is effective for up to two years, and may be modified or extended at the request of the 
petitioner. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 6(b).  
52 Pirius, supra note 36, at *12 (describing the consequences of violating an 
OFP). Minnesota law provides misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, and felony penalties for a 
violation of an OFP issued under the Domestic Abuse Act. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, 
subdiv. 14 (listing the criminal penalties for violating an OFP). The law establishes minimum 
sentences to be applied to misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, and felony convictions, as well 
as requiring the court to order the defendant to participate in counseling or other appropriate 
programs selected by the court. Id.  
53 Pirius, supra note 36, at *12 (noting the connection between all three of 
Minnesota’s domestic abuse statutes). See MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(a)(4) (listing 
violation of an OFP as a basis for issuing a DANCO). 
9
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2. Harassment Restraining Order 
 
 Like an OFP, a Harassment Restraining Order (HRO) is a civil 
protection order that restricts an actor’s contact with his or her victim.54 
Unlike OFPs, HROs must be petitioned for by and issued on behalf of a 
harassment victim.55 Furthermore, HROs are much narrower in scope than 
OFPs.56 Nevertheless, HROs are still an effective tool for protecting victims 
from abusers because there is no relationship requirement between the 
parties.57 
 The judicial process of obtaining a HRO is similar to that of an OFP 
in that a victim of harassment must petition a court and request relief 
pursuant to the HRO statute.58 The petition must allege sufficient facts 
showing harassment occurred and include an affidavit stating the specific 
                                                          
54 See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION: HARASSMENT 
RESTRAINING ORDERS, at *1 (2013), available at http://www.lmc.org/media/ 
document/1/harassmentrestrainingordersupdate2013.pdf?inline=true (mentioning the 
similarities between Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes). Minnesota law defines 
“harassment” as:  
(1) a single incident of physical or sexual assault or repeated incidents of 
intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial 
adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the 
safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship 
between the actor and the intended target; (2) targeted residential 
picketing; and (3) a pattern of attending public events after being notified 
that the actor’s presence at the event is harassing to another.  
MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 1(a).  
55 LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 54, at *1 (noting the differences between 
Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes). However, when the victim of harassment is a minor, the 
parent, guardian, or stepparent of the minor may seek a restraining order from the court on 
behalf of the minor. MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 2.  
56 For instance, a HRO may only “(1) [order] the respondent to cease or avoid the 
harassment of another person; or (2) [order] the respondent to have no contact with another 
person.” MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 5(a). Additionally, Minnesota case law has narrowly 
interpreted the definition of “physical assault” within the HRO statute to encompass only “the 
intentional infliction of or an attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.” LEAGUE OF MINN. 
CITIES, supra note 54, at *2 (citing Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 762–63 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2008)). Similarly, only certain types of words can be considered harassing. Id. In order 
to constitute harassment, words or comments must be more than inappropriate or 
argumentative—they must be “fighting words” or “true threats.” Id. (citing Dunham v. Roer, 
708 N.W.2d 552, 565–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (defining “fighting words” as words that a 
reasonable person would understand as being likely to cause the average person to fight and 
defining “true threats” as comments where the speaker means to communicate a serious intent 
to commit unlawful violence against a person)). 
57 LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 54, at *1 (noting that the lack of a familial 
relationship requirement allows more victims of harassment to seek judicial protection from 
their harassers).  
58 Compare MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdiv. 4 (stating the requirements for 
obtaining an OFP), with MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 3(a) (describing the process of 
requesting a HRO).  
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facts and circumstances from which judicial relief is sought.59 The petition 
must also state whether the petitioner has had a previous restraining order in 
effect against the respondent.60 A temporary restraining order may be issued, 
but its relief is limited.61 A respondent may request a judicial hearing to 
challenge the contents of the HRO petition.62 The court must find that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in 
harassment to grant the HRO.63 A HRO will be entered against the 
respondent if the judge determines harassment occurred.64 Violation of a 
HRO is subject to criminal penalties.65  
 
3. Domestic Abuse No Contact Order 
 
 A DANCO is a criminal protection order issued by a judicial court 
against a criminal defendant.66 Criminal no contact orders are an effective 
                                                          
59 MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 3(a) (listing the HRO petition requirements). 
The petition must allege facts sufficient to establish the identity of the alleged harassment 
victim (petitioner), of the alleged actor (respondent), and that the respondent has engaged in 
harassment. Id.  
60 Id. (stating an additional petition requirement that must be satisfied before an 
HRO will be issued).  
61 MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 4(b) (allowing for a temporary HRO to be 
issued in limited circumstances). A temporary restraining order is only available if the petition 
sufficiently alleges an immediate and present danger of harassment. Id. 
62 MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 5(b) (affording a respondent the opportunity to 
be heard before a HRO is issued).  
63 MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 5(b)(3) (stating when a court may issue a 
HRO). 
64 Id. (noting that the court must find “reasonable grounds to believe that the 
respondent has engaged in harassment” before issuing a HRO). 
65 MINN. STAT. § 609.748, subdiv. 6 (listing the criminal penalties for violating a 
HRO). See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 54, at *3 (discussing the consequences of 
violating a HRO). Minnesota law provides misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, and felony 
penalties for violation of a HRO and establishes minimum sentences to be imposed, dependent 
on the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. Unlike OFPs, a violation of a HRO issued 
pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 609.748 does not create a basis for imposition of a DANCO. Id. 
However, if the HRO is committed against a family or household member and issued pursuant 
to MINN. STAT. § 609.749, then the court may impose a DANCO against a criminal defendant 
in a proceeding addressing the HRO violation. MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(a)(2) (listing 
violation of a HRO as a basis for issuing a DANCO). 
66 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 223 (differentiating DANCOs from OFPs and HROs). A 
DANCO “may be issued” at the discretion of the judicial officer. MINN. STAT. 629.75, subdiv. 
1(b). See also State v. Milner, No. A-12-2137, 2013 WL 6152174, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 
25, 2013) (noting that district courts may exercise discretion in determining when to issue a 
DANCO because the DANCO statute does not require its issuance). A pretrial DANCO is 
generally issued at a criminal defendant’s first court appearance. SECOND JUDICIAL DIST. 
VIOLENCE COORDINATING COUNCIL, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR DOMESTIC ABUSE-
RELATED CRIMINAL CASES 34 (4th ed. 2013), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/ 
Documents/2/Public/Criminal_Court/Guidelines_DA_Related_Cases_Crim.pdf (providing 
guidance to courts in handling domestic abuse-related cases). Judges are encouraged to issue 
DANCOs “whenever applicable.” Id. The order itself is typically filled out before the court 
hearing by the city or county attorney’s office. Id. The order includes the name and identifying 
11
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tool to help protect victims of domestic violence while the abuser is in the 
midst of criminal prosecution.67 They are designed to prevent individuals 
who have been arrested for domestic violence-related offenses from 
contacting their victim.68 Minnesota has two types of DANCOs: (1) pretrial 
orders issued prior to final disposition of an underlying criminal matter and 
(2) post-conviction probationary orders.69 Regardless of which type of 
DANCO is being imposed on a criminal defendant, it must be issued in 
conjunction with a criminal proceeding in which the defendant is being 
charged with or convicted of a domestic violence-related offense.70  
 In 2010, the Minnesota legislature revised the DANCO statute.71 The 
new DANCO statute sought to clarify the original DANCO statute.72 The 
                                                                                                                                         
information of the defendant and victim(s) and addresses of locations where the defendant is 
prohibited from going. Id. at 34, 69. Additionally, the order states that the defendant is 
prohibited from having contact with the victim and that a violation of the order is a crime and 
may result in the defendant being arrested and charged with further criminal offenses. Id. at 
69. The defendant receives a copy of the DANCO after the order is signed by the judge. Id. at 
34. The DANCO remains in effect until the final disposition of the case unless modified or 
cancelled by written court order before the final disposition. Id. Judges are discouraged from 
canceling a pretrial DANCO before final disposition of the underlying criminal matter. Id. at 
35. The court considers the facts of the case, stated wishes of the victim and defendant, 
defendant’s criminal history, current posture of the case, and position of the prosecutor in 
determining whether to cancel an existing pretrial DANCO. Id.  
67 Jennifer G. Long et al., Model Policy For Prosecutors and Judges on 
Imposing, Modifying and Lifting Criminal No Contact Orders, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. 
PROJECT, 2 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/articles/Prosecutors_ 
Model_Policy_No_Contact_Orders.pdf (discussing the effectiveness of DANCOs in 
protecting domestic abuse victims). DANCOs are routinely issued in domestic abuse cases; 
approximately 11,000 DANCOs were issued by Minnesota judges in 2012. Patrick Thornton, 
All Sides Watching DANCO Challenge at Minnesota Supreme Court, MINN. LAW. (Jan. 4, 
2013) (noting the significant number of DANCOs issued by Minnesota district courts in 
2012). 
68 Long et al., supra note 67, at 2 (stating the purpose of issuing a DANCO 
against a criminal defendant). Prosecutors often seek DANCOs to protect victims from being 
intimidated or coerced by their abusers during the adjudication process. Thornton, supra note 
67 (noting the motivations of prosecutors for requesting DANCOs). See also Gunderson, 
supra note 14 (noting that the Clay County prosecutor requests a DANCO in every domestic 
abuse case to protect domestic abuse victims).  
69 MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(b) (providing for the issuance of a pretrial 
DANCO or probationary DANCO). 
70 See MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(a) (stipulating the types of criminal 
proceedings that may be the basis for imposing a DANCO). To impose a DANCO, the 
criminal defendant must be before the court in a proceeding for: (1) domestic abuse, (2) 
harassment or stalking of a family or household member, (3) an OFP violation, or (4) a prior 
DANCO violation. Id. The DANCO itself is “independent of any condition of pretrial release 
or probation imposed on the defendant . . . [and] may be issued in addition to a similar 
restriction imposed as a condition of pretrial release or probation.” MINN. STAT. § 629.75, 
subdiv. 1(b).  
71 Laws of Minnesota for 2010, supra note 32 (discussing the changes made to 
Minnesota’s DANCO statute). 
72 Id. (stating the Minnesota legislature’s purpose for replacing MINN. STAT. 
§ 518B.01, subdiv. 22 with MINN. STAT. § 629.75). 
12
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss2/8
2014] DANCO PROCEEDINGS 465 
 
Minnesota legislature also imposed stricter criminal penalties for violation of 
a DANCO.73 In 2013, the Minnesota legislature eliminated the knowledge 
requirement from the statute.74 
 
C. Challenging the Constitutionality of Minnesota’s Domestic Violence 
Statutes 
 
Minnesota courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of 
Minnesota’s civil domestic violence statutes.75 The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals has held that a defendant may not challenge the constitutionality of 
an OFP or HRO after it has been issued in another judicial proceeding.76 The 
court explained that a defendant is estopped from appealing a protective 
order at a subsequent hearing because he had a prior opportunity to directly 
appeal the protective order and, hence, the matter was finalized.77 
                                                          
73 Heim, supra note 24, at 958–59 (noting the differences between MINN. STAT. 
§518B.01, subdiv. 22 and MINN. STAT. § 629.75). The new statute’s language makes it a gross 
misdemeanor offense to violate a DANCO within ten years of a “previous qualified domestic 
violence-related offense conviction.” MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 2(c). A felony offense 
occurs when the DANCO violation occurs within ten years of the first of two or more 
“qualified domestic violence related offense convictions” or if the violation occurs while the 
violator is in possession of a dangerous weapon. MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 2(d).  
74 See Laws of Minnesota for 2013, Chapter 47–H.F. No. 1400, 2013 Leg., 88th 
Sess., at 4 (Minn. 2013), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/law/ 
2013/0/2013-047.pdf (indicating the changes made to MINN. STAT. § 629.75 in 2013). As a 
result, a criminal defendant may be convicted for inadvertently violating the DANCO statute. 
See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION: 2013 LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 2 
(2013), available at http://lmc.org/media/document/1/2013legislativeupdate.pdf?inline=true 
(highlighting the changes made to Minnesota’s domestic violence protective order statutes).  
75 Trial Court Memorandum at 6–7, State v. Ness, 2012 WL 9082737 (Clay 
County Feb. 9, 2012) (No. 14–CR–11–815), 2012 WL 9045545 (discussing the viability of 
constitutional challenges to Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes). 
76 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 223 (noting that a defendant may not challenge the 
issuance of a civil protective order in a subsequent proceeding addressing a violation of the 
order). In its determination, the Minnesota Court of Appeals relied on the prohibition of a 
defendant from “collaterally attacking” a protective order after it has been issued. Id. A 
collateral attack is “an attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal.” Id. 
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “collateral attack”)).  
77 Id. (discussing why a defendant may not collaterally attack a civil protective 
order). A defendant’s right to appeal a civil order is governed by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 
103.03(g). Id. (stating that a civil defendant may appeal a final order, decision, or judgment 
resulting from an administrative or special proceeding to the court of appeals). See State v. 
Romine, 757 N.W.2d 884, 889–90 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a defendant charged 
with violating an OFP could not collaterally attack the OFP because the defendant had the 
right to directly appeal the issuance of the OFP, but chose not to); see also State v. Harrington, 
504 N.W.2d 500, 502–03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a defendant who failed to 
appeal the validity of a HRO within the statutory appeal time could not collaterally attack the 
HRO in a subsequent criminal proceeding in which he was charged with violating the HRO).  
13
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A DANCO may be issued as a pretrial order prior to final disposition 
of an underlying criminal matter or as a post-conviction probationary order.78 
Post-conviction probationary DANCOs may be appealed along with the 
underlying conviction as a final judgment and order of the court.79 Pretrial 
DANCOs, however, are distinguishable from OFPs, HROs, and post-
conviction probationary DANCOs because they cannot be directly 
appealed.80 A criminal defendant may challenge the issuance of a pretrial 
DANCO in a subsequent proceeding for violation of that DANCO.81 
The constitutionality of Minnesota’s DANCO statute has been 
challenged primarily on grounds of violating a criminal defendant’s 
constitutional right to due process of law.82 A defendant may challenge the 
constitutionality of a law by either arguing it is invalid on its face (facial 
challenge) or that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant’s 
                                                          
78 MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(b) (stating the two types of DANCOs a court 
may issue).  
79 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 224 (noting that a defendant may directly appeal the 
issuance of a probationary DANCO because probationary DANCOs are issued after the final 
disposition of the underlying criminal matter). A criminal defendant’s right to appeal a 
criminal order to the court of appeals is governed by Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subdivs. 1–2. 
Id. A criminal defendant may appeal adverse final judgments, sentences, or orders allowing or 
imposing conditions of release. Id.  
80 Id. (noting that pretrial DANCOs are an exception to the collateral attack 
prohibition). DANCOs are not final orders of the court and therefore cannot be appealed 
pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02. Id. 
81 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 224 (discussing why a pretrial DANCO should be treated 
differently than Minnesota’s other protective orders). A defendant in a pretrial DANCO 
hearing does not have a clear right to immediately appeal the issuance of the pretrial DANCO. 
Id. As a result, the defendant may collaterally attack the issuance of the pretrial DANCO in a 
subsequent proceeding for violation of that DANCO. Id. (distinguishing Davis v. Danielson, 
558 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a defendant cannot collaterally 
attack a district court order when the order is directly appealable)).  
82 See, e.g., State v. Achin, Nos. A12-0437, A12-438, 2012 WL 4774670 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2012), stay and review granted, (Minn. Dec. 18, 2012), review denied and 
stay vacated, (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) (arguing that MINN. STAT. § 629.75 is unconstitutional 
because it violates a defendant’s due process rights); State v. Jones, No. A12-0016, 2012 WL 
5381847 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 05, 2012), stay and review granted, (Minn. Jan. 29, 2013), 
review denied and stay vacated, (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) (maintaining that MINN. STAT. 
§ 629.75 is unconstitutional because it violates procedural due process, substantive due 
process, and is unconstitutionally vague); State v. Minnick, No. A12-0131, 2012 WL 5381850 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 05, 2012), stay and review granted, (Minn. Jan. 29, 2013), review 
denied and stay vacated, (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) (contending that MINN. STAT. § 629.75 
violates a defendant’s procedural and substantive due process rights). The Minnesota Supreme 
Court postponed reviewing these cases until after Ness. See State v. Achin, 2012 Minn. 
LEXIS 705 (Minn. Dec. 18, 2012) (“[F]urther proceedings are stayed pending final 
disposition of State v. Ness . . . .”); State v. Jones, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 56 (Minn. Jan. 29, 
2013); State v. Minnick, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 55 (Minn. Jan. 29, 2013). The court subsequently 
denied review of the cases after declaring Minnesota’s DANCO statute does not violate a 
defendant’s due process rights in Ness. See State v. Achin, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 435 (Minn. 
Sept. 17, 2013) (denying review of the petition); State v. Jones, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 442 
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) (stating that the Ness opinion was filed July 24, 2013 and denying 
review of the petition); State v. Minnick, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 434 (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).  
14
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particular circumstances (as-applied challenge).83 In a facial challenge a 
defendant must prove no application of the law would be constitutional.84 In 
an as-applied challenge, however, a defendant must show that while the law 
is generally constitutional, it was unconstitutionally applied to the 
defendant.85 Facial challenges render the entire law unconstitutional.86 
Conversely, as-applied challenges only render the law unconstitutional 
concerning that particular defendant’s case.87 
Every defendant is afforded a constitutional right to due process of 
law.88 The due process provision of the United States Constitution states “no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.”89 Similarly, the due process provision of the Minnesota Constitution 
provides that “no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense 
without due process of law.”90 Both the United States Constitution and 
Minnesota Constitution require a person receive adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before being deprived of life, liberty, or property.91 
In determining whether a person’s right to procedural due process has been 
violated, the court must first conclude that a protected liberty is implicated.92 
If a protected liberty is implicated, the court must then determine what 
process is due by applying a balancing test.93 While the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals has ruled that a protected liberty is implicated in a DANCO 
                                                          
83 Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 657–58 (2010) (discussing the two types of constitutional challenges). 
84 Id. at 657 (explaining the defendant’s burden in a facial challenge). 
85 Id. (distinguishing facial challenges from as-applied challenges).  
86 Id. at 658 (advising against the use of facial challenges because they render an 
entire law unconstitutional).  
87 Id. (noting that courts favor as-applied challenges because they allow for some 
deference to the legislative process). 
88 See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing procedural due process of law). The basic requirements of 
procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id. 
89 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 225 (quoting U.S. CONST. amends. Vl, XIV § 1). 
90 Id. (quoting MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7). 
91 Id. (quoting Christopher v. Windom Area Sch. Bd., 781 N.W.2d 904, 911 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010)). 
92 Id. (describing the analysis a court must undergo in determining whether due 
process of law has been adequately afforded).  
93 Id. (explaining the due process analysis arose out of the United States Supreme 
Court case, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). In undergoing the analysis, a court 
must balance:  
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the governmental action; 
(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures 
used and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
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proceeding, it has yet to find a case in which the liberty is deprived to such 
an extent as to render the DANCO statute unconstitutional.94 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 In State v. Ness, the Minnesota Supreme Court further limited the 
ability of criminal defendants to challenge the constitutionality of the 
DANCO statute.95 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota 
Statute § 629.75 does not facially violate a defendant’s right to procedural 
due process because of the context in which the DANCO is issued. 96 The 
DANCO statute provides a defendant with constitutionally sufficient due 
process of law through notice of and opportunity to be heard at the 
underlying criminal matter’s proceeding.97 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
On January 27, 2011, Bryan Paul Ness was arrested for allegedly 
assaulting his wife, N.R.N.98 Ness was ultimately charged with gross 
misdemeanor child endangerment, gross misdemeanor domestic assault, 
                                                          
94 Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 228 (applying the Mathews balancing test to the facts of 
Ness). The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that the private interest at stake is the 
defendant’s right to contact a family or household member. Id. As a result, this interest and the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of it through unfair process must be balanced against the 
nature of the government’s interest. Id. The court found that there was a significant enough 
state interest in protecting the victims of domestic violence and upholding the integrity of the 
judicial process to warrant upholding the constitutionality of the DANCO statute. Id.  
95 Id. at 183–86 (explaining the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
rejecting Ness’s facial procedural due process challenge).  
96 Id. at 182–83 (emphasizing the “immediately following” language of MINN. 
STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1(c)). 
97 Id. at 183 n.4 (summarizing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding). The 
Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that a defendant may still bring an as-applied 
constitutional challenge to determine whether that particular defendant received 
constitutionally sufficient notice of the DANCO prior to its issuance. Id. Following Ness, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals has rejected criminal defendants’ contentions that the DANCO 
statute violates procedural due process. See, e.g., Milner, 2013 WL 6152174, at *3 (rejecting a 
criminal defendant’s procedural due process challenge to the DANCO statute due to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Ness). Even so, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has 
not yet barred as-applied constitutional challenges, noting “Ness left open the possibility of as-
applied challenges”. Id. Furthermore, in Milner, the Minnesota Court of Appeals questioned 
whether the district court complied with the DANCO statute in issuing the DANCO against 
Milner, stating “[t]he record does not clearly reveal that a separate proceeding was held for the 
purpose of issuing the order.” Id. at *3 n.1. The court, however, did not address the potential 
due process violation because Milner had not raised the issue on appeal. Id. 
98 Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at *3–5, State v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d 219 
(Minn. 2012) (Nos. A12-290, A12-291), 2012 WL 8747569 (describing the events leading to 
the first DANCO).  
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gross misdemeanor fifth degree assault, and misdemeanor domestic assault.99 
During the initial hearing, the district court issued a pretrial DANCO 
(DANCO 1) pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1(b), 
prohibiting Ness from contacting N.R.N. and going near N.R.N.’s place of 
residence.100 Ness, present and represented by counsel at the hearing, signed 
DANCO 1.101 Ness was also served with a copy of DANCO 1 following the 
hearing.102  
Ness and his attorney appeared in court on February 14, 2011, and 
entered a guilty plea to a misdemeanor domestic assault charge.103 The court 
accepted the guilty plea and Ness requested an amendment to DANCO 1 to 
allow him supervised visits with his children.104 The court granted Ness’s 
request.105 
On March 6, 2011, Ness went to N.R.N’s apartment and refused to 
leave.106 Police were called and Ness was arrested and charged with violating 
DANCO 1.107 The DANCO 1 violation was enhanced to a felony offense 
because Ness had two “previous qualified domestic violence related 
convictions” within the past ten years.108 On March 7, 2011, Ness appeared 
before the district court for the DANCO 1 violation.109 The court issued a 
new pretrial DANCO (DANCO 2) that prohibited Ness from contacting 
                                                          
99 Id. at *5 (listing the criminal offenses Ness was ultimately charged with 
stemming from the January 27, 2011, incident). 
100 Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, at *5 (discussing the scope 
of the first DANCO). DANCO 1 is the first of four DANCOs ultimately issued in this case. Id. 
at *5–9. DANCO 2 was issued following Ness’s first felony DANCO violation. Id. at *7. 
DANCO 3 was a probationary DANCO issued at sentencing for the fifth-degree misdemeanor 
assault. Id. at *7–8. DANCO 4 was issued following Ness’s second felony DANCO violation. 
Id. at *9. Of the four DANCOs, only DANCO 1 and DANCO 2 are the subjects of Ness’s due 
process challenge. Id. at *5, 7. 
101 Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, *5 (explaining the 
circumstances in which DANCO 1 was issued). 
102 Id. (mentioning that Ness received a copy of DANCO 1).  
103 Id. (stating Ness pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor domestic violence-related 
offense). 
104 Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, at *5–6 (discussing Ness’s 
request for modification of DANCO 1). 
105 Id. (noting the court did modify DANCO 1). In granting the request the court 
reminded Ness not to have any contact with N.R.N. and that any further contact would result 
in a new charge for violating the DANCO. Id. 
106 Id. at *6 (describing the events leading to the first DANCO violation). 
107 Id. at *6–7 (establishing Ness’s arrest for violating DANCO 1). 
108 Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, at *6–7 (discussing why 
Ness’s DANCO violation was enhanced to a felony-level offense). In addition to the guilty 
plea to domestic assault on February 14, 2011, Ness had a prior conviction for fifth-degree 
assault in 2009. Id. at *7. Qualified domestic violence-related offenses (QDVROs) include: 
“first and second-degree murder; assault; domestic assault; criminal sexual conduct; malicious 
punishment of a child; stalking; interference with an emergency call; terroristic threats; and 
violating an existing order for protection, ex parte order for protection, HRO, or domestic 
abuse no contact order.” MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 16 (2013).  
109 Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 98, at *7 (mentioning Ness was 
present at the judicial hearing for the first DANCO violation). 
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N.R.N. and restricted him from going to N.R.N.’s residence.110 Ness was 
personally served with the new order and signed it.111 On November 23, 
2011, Ness once again appeared at N.R.N.’s apartment and refused to 
leave.112 Police arrested Ness and he was charged with a felony violation of a 
DANCO and gross misdemeanor obstructing legal process.113 
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
In January 2012, Ness filed a motion with the Clay County District 
Court to dismiss the felony DANCO violation charges.114 Ness argued that 
Minnesota Statute § 629.75 is facially unconstitutional because it violates a 
criminal defendant’s right to procedural due process under the United States 
and Minnesota Constitutions.115 The district court agreed, holding that the 
DANCO statute is unconstitutional on due-process grounds.116 The district 
court emphasized the lack of effective procedural options available to 
criminal defendants for contesting the issuance of a DANCO.117 
Furthermore, the district court criticized the lack of legislative guidance or 
                                                          
110 Id. (noting the scope of the second DANCO). On April 4, 2011, the district 
court modified DANCO 2 to allow Ness to have telephone contact with N.R.N., and Ness 
signed the modified order. Id. 
111 Id. (stating Ness received a copy of DANCO 2 after the judicial hearing). 
112 Id. at *8–9 (describing the events leading to the second DANCO violation). 
113 Id. at *9 (noting the criminal offenses Ness was charged with as a result of the 
November 23, 2011, incident). The new felony DANCO violation charge was based on Ness’s 
violation of DANCO 2. Id. During the arrest, Ness refused to cooperate with police orders and 
was ultimately charged with obstruction of legal process. Id. 
114 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 222 (stating that Ness filed a motion to dismiss the 
DANCO violation charges prior to the court trial scheduled to address them). 
115 Trial Court Memorandum, supra note 75, at 8 (discussing Ness’s arguments). 
Ness argued that the DANCO statute does not provide adequate notice and opportunity to be 
heard and is unconstitutionally vague. Id. A criminal statute violates the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine “(1) if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute; or (2) if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.” Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 228. At issue in Ness was the second 
type of vagueness, arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Trial Court Memorandum, supra 
note 75, at 11. 
116 Trial Court Memorandum, supra note 75, at 13 (explaining the district court’s 
reasoning). The district court first determined that Ness may challenge the constitutionality of 
the DANCO statute in a subsequent proceeding because MINN. STAT. § 629.75 implicates a 
protected liberty and may be distinguished from Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes. See 
supra notes 80–81 (discussing the ability of a criminal defendant charged with a pretrial 
DANCO violation to collaterally attack it in a subsequent criminal proceeding).  
117 Trial Court Memorandum, supra note 75, at 9–10 (stressing a defendant’s lack 
of advance notice and opportunity to prepare for the DANCO hearing as evidence of the 
ineffective process provided for under the DANCO statute). The district court noted that a 
defendant may or may not be represented by counsel at the pretrial release hearing or have the 
ability or opportunity to review the petition prior to the DANCO hearing. Id. at 9. 
Furthermore, MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdivs. 1(b), (c) do not establish a burden of proof for 
the DANCO proceeding. Id. 
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standards for district courts in issuing a DANCO.118 The district court 
determined that the absence of standards or restrictions rendered the statute 
unconstitutionally vague.119 
The State appealed the district court’s holding to the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals.120 The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district 
court’s allowance of the collateral attack, but it reversed the district court’s 
determination that the DANCO statute is unconstitutional.121 The court found 
that while there is the possibility a defendant may be erroneously deprived of 
a constitutionally protected right pending trial, that risk is minimal and 
justified.122 The court also determined that the DANCO statute provides a 
                                                          
118 Id. at 10–11 (observing that MINN. STAT. § 629.75 fails to provide any 
legislative guidance or standards for a district court to apply when determining whether to 
issue a DANCO). The DANCO statute defines what a DANCO is and explains in what types 
of cases a DANCO may be issued. Id. at 11. The district court compared the DANCO statute 
with Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes. Id. at 12. The court noted that both the OFP and 
HRO statutes contain extensive procedural requirements and guidance, such as: (1) explicitly 
stating who may petition the court for relief; (2) listing what must be alleged in the petition; 
(3) providing notice and service requirements; (4) describing under what circumstances a 
hearing takes place; (5) stating what relief may be provided by the court; and (6) providing the 
procedures for extending, modifying, or vacating an order. Id. The district court stated that the 
lack of legislative guidance allowed courts “absolute and unfettered discretion in determining 
when to issue a DANCO.” Id. at 13. The district court feared such unfettered judicial 
discretion would “create a great danger that the statute will be applied arbitrarily and 
inconsistently.” Id. See also MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 14; Thornton, 
supra note 67 (noting there has been no uniform application of the DANCO statute by district 
courts).  
119 Trial Court Memorandum, supra note 75, at 13 (finding the DANCO statute 
void-for-vagueness). The district court rejected the State’s argument that a court can judicially 
fix procedural defects in a statute to remedy any unconstitutional vagueness. Id. at 9–10. The 
State relied on State v. Coleman, 731 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), which held an 
enhanced sentencing statute constitutional even though the statute lacked specific procedural 
guidance because a court could adequately protect defendants’ rights through “unique 
judiciary functions.” Id. at 10. The court distinguished Coleman from Ness, noting that a court 
cannot impose limitations on discretion that do not appear on the face of the statute. Id. (citing 
State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. 1985) (holding that courts cannot cure a 
statute of vagueness by “imposing post facto limitations where no such restraints appear on 
the face of the legislation”)). 
120 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 221 (noting the procedural posture of the case). 
121 Id. at 230 (discussing the Minnesota Court of Appeals’’ holding). The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that pretrial DANCOs are not final 
court orders and therefore do not provide criminal defendants a clear right to appeal the 
issuance of the DANCO. Id. at 224. See supra text accompanying note 80 (distinguishing 
pretrial DANCOs from OFPs and HROs). The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not declare the 
DANCO statute unconstitutional because criminal defendants are afforded some due process 
when courts issue DANCOs pursuant to the DANCO statute. Id. at 226.  
122 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 228 (rejecting Ness’s argument that the DANCO statute 
violates a defendant’s constitutional rights). See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ application of the Mathews balancing test to the 
facts of Ness). The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that the state’s significant interest in 
protecting the victims of domestic violence and upholding the integrity of the judicial process 
justifies any risk of violating a defendant’s right to contact family or household members. 
Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 226, 228. The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that sufficient 
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defendant with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.123 The court 
noted that while the DANCO statute itself does not contain a notice 
provision, adequate notice is provided through notice of the underlying 
criminal charge.124 Further, the DANCO statute provides some safeguards 
ensuring defendants are not erroneously deprived of a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.125 Finally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
determined that, while it is true Minnesota Statute § 629.75 does not 
explicitly set forth the factors the district court should consider in deciding 
whether to issue a DANCO, the absence of those factors alone is not enough 
to invalidate the DANCO statute.126 The court reasoned that a judge’s 
discretion in issuing a DANCO is sufficiently limited because there must be 
                                                                                                                                         
safeguards exist to ensure that defendants are not erroneously deprived of their constitutional 
liberties. Id. at 227. Specifically, the court emphasized the requirement that, in order for a 
district court to issue a DANCO, it must first find sufficient probable cause exists regarding 
the underlying criminal charge. Id. 
123 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 225–28 (referring to the concept of procedural due 
process as flexible) (citing Sweet v. Comm’r of Human Servs., 702 N.W.2d 314, 320 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2005)). The degree of notice required is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 
226 (citing Comm’r of Natural Res. v. Nicollet Cnty. Pub. Water/Wetlands Hearings Unit, 
633 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001)). 
124 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 226 (determining that the DANCO statute provides 
adequate due process in conjunction with other statutory provisions and safeguards). A 
DANCO is issued in connection with a criminal proceeding. Id. Defendants are provided 
notice of the underlying criminal charge when the defendant is served with a copy of the 
complaint. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals maintained that by receiving notice of the 
criminal proceeding from which the DANCO is issued, the defendant receives notice of the 
DANCO because MINN. STAT. § 629.75 specifies with what charges a DANCO may be issued 
in connection. Id.  
125 Id. at 227 (noting that due process requires “some form of a hearing” be 
provided for by the challenged statute to ensure an individual is not deprived of a protected 
interest) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333). The DANCO statute states that a DANCO “shall 
be issued in a proceeding that is separate from but held immediately following a proceeding in 
which any pretrial release or sentencing issues are decided.” MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 
1(c). By providing for such a proceeding separate from the underlying criminal pretrial 
hearing, a defendant is provided a meaningful opportunity to challenge the validity of the 
DANCO. Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 227. Furthermore, a defendant may request the court modify or 
lift the DANCO at a subsequent proceeding. Id. at 228. Further, Minnesota case law does not 
afford criminal defendants the same degree of procedural safeguards at a pretrial hearing as 
they would receive at a trial. Id. at 227 (citing State v. Rud, 359 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 
1984)). The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that a criminal defendant at a pretrial 
proceeding, separate from the pretrial hearing, is entitled to “even fewer adversarial 
safeguards.” Id.  
126 Ness, 819 N.W.2d at 229 (reversing the district court’s holding that the 
DANCO statute is impermissibly vague). The Minnesota Court of Appeals had previously 
held that a statute is not void for vagueness when the state is required to show the offense was 
committed within the definition of the crime charged. Id. at 229 (discussing In re Welfare of 
K.C., 513 N.W.2d 18, 21–22 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
determined that the DANCO statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it requires the 
DANCO be issued following the underlying criminal charge’s hearing, at which the state must 
prove probable cause. Id. at 230. 
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an underlying, qualified criminal offense before a court can issue a 
DANCO.127 
 
C. Reasoning of the Court 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Ness’s 
case.128 The only issue before the court was whether Minnesota Statute 
§ 629.75 is facially unconstitutional on due process grounds.129 The court 
noted that the challenger bears the burden of proving that the legislation is 
unconstitutional in all applications in a facial challenge.130 The court 
determined that Ness did not meet his burden in establishing that Minnesota 
Statute § 629.75 fails to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard 
every time a DANCO is issued.131 As a result, the court found that the 
                                                          
127 Id. at 229 (noting the DANCO statute sufficiently limits a district court judge’s 
discretion because it requires a specific type of criminal proceeding already be underway in 
order for a DANCO to be issued). The Minnesota Court of Appeals observed that when 
setting terms of conditional release, courts are already looking to the factors contained in 
Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, subdiv. 2 for guidance in determining whether to issue a DANCO. Id. 
These factors include “the facts surrounding the arrest, the weight of the evidence against the 
defendant, the defendant’s record of convictions, the seriousness of the offense, the threat 
posed by contact with the alleged victim, and the preferences of the alleged victim.” Id. at 
229–30. Additionally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that a defendant is not estopped 
from challenging the issuance of the DANCO at his initial appearance or at a subsequent 
proceeding. Id. at 230. 
128 Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 181 (stating the procedural posture of the case). 
129 Id. (noting the issues before the court for review). The Minnesota Supreme 
Court considered whether on its face the DANCO statute: “(1) always fails to provide 
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard or (2) encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.” Id. The State did not challenge the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ holding that 
Ness could collaterally challenge the constitutionality of MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1. Id. 
130 Id. at 182 (stating that in a facial challenge the defendant must establish that no 
set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid) (citing United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Courts rarely declare laws unconstitutional, exercising 
their power to do so “with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” Id. (citing In 
re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989)). A facial challenge is the most difficult 
challenge to successfully assert, making the challenger’s burden especially difficult to 
establish. Id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745). 
131 Id. at 183 (analyzing the three subparts of MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1 and 
determining that the statute does provide for adequate notice and opportunity to be heard). 
Ness’s facial challenge to the DANCO statute could not overcome its heavy burden because 
the court determined due process was afforded in at least one circumstance. Id. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court compared Ness to McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 831 N.W.2d 518, 522 
(Minn. 2013). Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 183. In McCaughtry, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
rejected a defendant’s facial challenge to a city ordinance because the ordinance, on its face, 
provided for judicial discretion in issuing the administrative warrant. McCaughtry, 831 
N.W.2d at 524. The court concluded that like the ordinance statute in McCaughtry, MINN. 
STAT. § 629.75 provides, on its face, for a subsequent judicial proceeding during which the 
district court judge may exercise his or her discretion in determining whether to issue the 
DANCO. Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 183. The Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized that it is the 
“immediately following” requirement of MINN. STAT. § 629.75 that ensures a defendant 
receives “notice of the conditions to be imposed and an opportunity to challenge those 
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DANCO statute could not be held to be procedurally inadequate.132 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court further determined that Ness failed to establish 
that Minnesota Statute § 629.75 is unconstitutionally vague because the 
statute does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.133 The 
court noted that while the United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
laws must provide explicit standards for application to prevent arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement, broad grants of discretion are common and the 
lack of factors alone does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague.134  
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
 District courts need guidance in determining when and how 
DANCOs should be issued.135 Ness establishes troubling precedent for 
criminal defendants by essentially eliminating facial challenges to procedural 
due process as a viable basis to challenge the constitutionality of Minnesota 
                                                                                                                                         
conditions in a constitutionally sufficient proceeding immediately before the court imposes a 
[DANCO].” Id. 
132 Id. at 182 (explaining that if the statute can be constitutionally applied in one 
set of facts, it is “inappropriate to speculate regarding other hypothetical circumstances that 
might arise”) (citing Minn. Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 694 
(Minn. 2009)). 
133 Id. at 184–85 (noting that MINN. STAT. § 629.75 does, on its face, limit a 
judge’s discretion in issuing DANCOs). The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that, like 
the OFP and HRO statutes, the DANCO statute provided for sufficient judicial checks to 
ensure constitutionality. Id. For instance, under the terms of MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 
1(a), a judge may only issue a DANCO to a limited class of individuals. Id. at 185. 
Additionally, subdiv. 1(b) places restrictions on the form of a DANCO and requires a hearing 
be held. Id. Further, subdiv. 1(c) places limitations on when a DANCO may be issued. Id. 
These requirements, coupled with Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, act as checks on a court’s authority, 
ensuring that DANCOs are limited to cases in which:  
(1) the court has made a preliminary finding that there is probable cause to 
believe that the defendant has committed one of the enumerated offenses, 
(2) the court has considered whether a no contact order is necessary for 
the safety of the victim or other persons, and (3) the court has issued a 
written order setting forth the conditions of release.  
Id.  
134 Ness, 834 N.W.2d at 184 (stating that a legislature must establish minimal 
guidelines to govern enforcement of its law in order for the law to avoid being struck down on 
vagueness grounds) (citing City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999)). A vague law 
“impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to . . . judges and juries for resolution . . . on a 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Id. 
(quoting In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. 1978) (quoting Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972))). As a result, laws must provide administrative and 
judicial bodies with explicit standards regarding their application to prevent arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court notes that broad grants of 
power are nevertheless common and are sufficiently limited by judicial discretion. Id. Judicial 
discretion is further limited by the principle that “all acts of judicial discretion require 
‘conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.’” Id. (quoting State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 
638 (Minn. 2008)). 
135 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the lack of judicial 
uniformity in interpreting Minnesota’s DANCO statute).  
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Statute § 629.75.136 Minnesota’s DANCO statute itself fails to provide courts 
with detailed enough procedural standards and judicial restrictions to render 
the statute wholly valid.137 Criminal defendants’ constitutionally-protected 
liberties will continue to be restricted and infringed upon without further 
legislative guidance.138  
 
A. Some, But Not All, DANCO Proceedings Will Afford Effective 
Procedural Due Process 
 
Despite the Minnesota courts’ belief that the DANCO statute 
sufficiently protects criminal defendants’ rights, not all criminal defendants 
receive sufficient procedural due process prior to the issuance of a 
DANCO.139 Criminal defendants’ procedural due process rights are only 
upheld when the DANCO is imposed immediately following a pretrial 
hearing that provides constitutionally sufficient notice and an opportunity to 
be heard.140 The initial hearing for the underlying criminal matter must afford 
a criminal defendant the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the 
hearing in order to pass constitutional muster.141 In principle, Minnesota’s 
DANCO statute is constitutional on its face because a criminal defendant is 
theoretically provided notice and an opportunity to be heard at the hearing 
regarding the underlying criminal matter.142 Ness essentially forecloses any 
opportunity for criminal defendants to successfully bring facial challenges 
against Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1.143 Nonetheless, the DANCO 
statute can still be challenged on an as-applied basis.144  
 
                                                          
136 See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s holding in Ness); see also supra note 82 (noting the negative impact of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ness on subsequent appeals challenging the 
constitutionality of MINN. STAT. § 629.75 on due process grounds).  
137 See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (discussing the void-for-
vagueness doctrine). 
138 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (providing the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals’ analysis of the Mathews balancing test). 
139 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (providing an example of when a 
DANCO may not have been issued in a separate proceeding, thereby potentially violating a 
defendant’s right to due process); see also supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the 
lack of judicial uniformity in DANCO enforcement). 
140 See supra text accompanying notes 130–132 (discussing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s holding that Ness failed to meet his burden in proving that the DANCO 
statute is unconstitutional in all applications as required by a facial challenge). 
141 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (exploring the statutorily provided 
protections in the DANCO statute). 
142 See supra notes 129–132 (describing the difficulties parties face in raising a 
facial challenge under the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis). 
143  See supra text accompanying notes 129–132 (providing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s holding in Ness). 
144 See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (discussing the facial and as-
applied constitutional challenges).  
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1. Circumstances Affording Constitutionally Sufficient Procedural Due 
Process Are Few and Far Between 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the DANCO 
statute as constitutional is the result of a tortured analysis, because the court 
did not limit its analysis solely to the DANCO statute.145 Generally, a 
defendant rarely succeeds on a facial challenge due to the onerous burden 
imposed by the courts, as evidenced by the Ness case. 146 In Ness, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court created a theoretical circumstance in which a 
defendant’s procedural due process rights are satisfied by focusing on the 
rare occasion when a DANCO is issued immediately following a pretrial 
hearing.147 In doing so, the Minnesota Supreme Court constructed its own 
tangential interpretation of the DANCO statute.148 The court’s interpretation 
relies too heavily on other judicial rules and statutory provisions to ensure 
that constitutionally sufficient due process is provided to a defendant in a 
DANCO proceeding.149  
To render the statute constitutional, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
was required to supplement the language of Minnesota Statute § 629.75 with 
other statutory language because the DANCO statute itself does not include a 
stand-alone notice provision.150 On its face, the statute provides for a 
theoretically separate proceeding to occur “immediately following” the 
conclusion of pretrial proceedings for the underlying criminal matter.151 
Reconstruction of statutes should not be the primary basis for rejecting a 
defendant’s constitutional challenge; courts should judge the constitutionality 
of a law on the language stated in that law and not on other related or 
implicated laws.152 Still, the Minnesota Supreme Court did loosely construct 
                                                          
145 See supra text accompanying note 97 (noting that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court suggested a defendant could still bring an as-applied constitutional challenge to 
determine whether that particular defendant received constitutionally sufficient notice of the 
DANCO prior to its issuance). 
146 See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text (explaining that the facial 
challenge is the most difficult challenge to successfully assert). 
147 See supra note 129–130 (discussing the Salerno test for facial challenges). 
148 See supra note 133 (coupling MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1, with Minn. R. 
Crim. P. 6.02 to establish procedural due process). 
149 See supra notes 127, 133 (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on 
the context in which a DANCO is issued in determining whether the DANCO statute affords 
notice and an opportunity to be heard). 
150 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing the circumstances in 
which a DANCO is issued and noting that the Minnesota Court of Appeals maintained that the 
defendant received notice of the DANCO by receiving notice of the criminal proceeding).  
151 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (stating that the DANCO statute 
provides that a DANCO “shall be issued in a proceeding that is separate from but held 
immediately following a proceeding in which any pretrial release or sentencing issues are 
decided”). 
152 See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that the DANCO could not be held procedurally invalid because it could be 
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a circumstance in which a defendant’s procedural due process rights are not 
inappropriately restricted.153 As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
holding that Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1 is facially constitutional 
was proper.154  
 
2. The DANCO Statute May Be Successfully Challenged Under the 
As-Applied Doctrine 
 
 Criminal defendants will not be successful in facially challenging 
Minnesota Statute § 629.75 after Ness.155 Nevertheless, defendants should 
still challenge its constitutionality by asserting that the statute was 
unconstitutionally applied to their particular case.156 Such challenges will 
provide courts with the opportunity to establish judicial guidance on when 
and how a court should issue a DANCO.157 
 Ness does not provide controlling precedent for future as-applied 
challenges against the DANCO statute, because Ness’s circumstances are not 
typical of all DANCO cases.158 Ness received constitutionally sufficient due 
process because he was afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
charges levied against him.159 Unlike many criminal defendants, Ness 
received the assistance of legal counsel throughout the adjudication process 
(providing him the opportunity to understand the charges against him) and 
was warned of the criminal consequences of violating a DANCO.160 
Furthermore, Ness’s procedural due process rights were protected because 
the district court properly conducted the hearings related to the underlying 
criminal matters and properly issued the DANCOs.161 Specifically, the trial 
court issued the DANCOs in relation to, but separate from, the conditions of 
                                                                                                                                         
constitutionally applied in one set of facts; therefore, it is “inappropriate to speculate 
regarding other hypothetical circumstances that might arise”). 
153 See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text (describing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s analysis of Ness’s facial challenge to the DANCO statute). 
154 See supra text accompanying note 131 (discussing the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s holding that the DANCO statute was facially constitutional). 
155 See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text (analyzing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s discussion of the facial constitutionality and void-for-vagueness of the 
DANCO statute). 
156 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that a defendant may still 
bring an as-applied due process constitutional challenge against MINN. STAT. § 629.75). 
157 See supra notes 67, 118 (stating the purpose of issuing a DANCO against a 
criminal defendant, but noting the lack of judicial uniformity in DANCO enforcement). 
158 See supra text accompanying notes 101–113 (providing the facts of Ness). 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 101–103; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 109–111 (noting that Ness was represented by legal counsel at his 
hearings and was given several warnings from the judge overseeing his case). 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 101–103, 105 (describing Ness’s legal 
counsel’s representation during the hearings). 
161 See supra notes 127, 133 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals’ and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holdings that there were sufficient 
limits on a judge’s discretion in issuing a DANCO). 
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release and warned Ness on the record that any violation of the DANCOs 
may result in further criminal charges.162 Moreover, Ness’s decision to 
exercise additional rights afforded to him under Minnesota law by 
successfully petitioning the court to modify his DANCOs further evidences 
that Ness received due process of law.163 
The facts of Ness, however, are unique and are not representative of 
all DANCO adjudications.164 Criminal defendants are often confused, ill-
informed, and disorientated during the initial pretrial proceedings.165 
Although Ness received explicit notice of his DANCOs, most defendants do 
not receive such notice prior to the issuance of the DANCO.166 Similarly, 
defendants may or may not be represented by legal counsel during their 
pretrial hearings.167 As a result, pro se criminal defendants are not afforded 
the same opportunities to understand the charges against them or the 
consequences for violating a DANCO. 168  
Additionally, the timeframe for the DANCO hearing provided for 
under the DANCO statute does not afford criminal defendants sufficient time 
to respond to the DANCO request.169 Defendants are not afforded 
meaningful opportunities to review the orders, subpoena witnesses, or gather 
evidence to present in their defense by holding the DANCO proceeding 
“immediately after” the underlying criminal matter’s pretrial hearing.170  
Lack of explicit notice, legal counsel, and meaningful opportunities 
to respond to DANCO requests do not provide constitutionally sufficient 
procedural due process.171 As a result, individual defendants subjected to 
                                                          
162 See supra notes 101, 105, 110 and accompanying text (noting the 
circumstances in which the DANCOs were issued). 
163 See supra text accompanying note 104; see also supra note 125 and 
accompanying text (discussing the various instances in which Ness exercised his right to 
modify his DANCOs). 
164 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting the district court’s finding 
that a defendant may or may not be represented by counsel at the pretrial release hearing or 
have the ability or opportunity to review the petition prior to the DANCO hearing). 
165 See supra text accompanying notes 4–6 (describing the judicial process from a 
defendant’s point of view). 
166 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (stating that a defendant’s lack of 
advance notice and opportunity to prepare for the DANCO hearing could be seen as evidence 
of the ineffective process provided for under the DANCO statute). 
167 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting not all criminal defendants 
are represented by legal counsel during a pretrial hearing). 
168 See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text (discussing the various 
difficulties enumerated by the district court that defendants face in a DANCO hearing). 
169 See supra notes 117, 125 and accompanying text (stating that a DANCO “shall 
be issued in a proceeding that is separate from but held immediately following a proceeding in 
which any pretrial release or sentencing issues are decided” which may not afford the 
defendant enough time to prepare for the hearing or seek legal counsel). 
170 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting the lack of process afforded 
criminal defendants with regard to the DANCO hearing).  
171 See supra notes 117, 125 and accompanying text (discussing the various 
reasons an “immediate hearing” may not provide adequate constitutional protections for 
defendants in DANCO hearings). 
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these circumstances should seek redress in an as-applied challenge to the 
constitutionality of Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1.172 The reviewing 
court would then be able to consider the particular facts of the case rather 
than merely relying on statutory language and interpretation.173 As a result, 
the court may find the DANCO statute unconstitutional as applied to the 
individual defendant and, therefore, excise the DANCO and its violations 
from the defendant’s criminal record.174 Holding the DANCO statute 
narrowly unconstitutional in certain instances will provide district courts 
with persuasive case law that can be looked to in determining the proper 
judicial procedure for issuing a DANCO.175 
 
B. The Standard for Determining Vagueness Is Too Strictly Interpreted by 
Courts 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine too strictly in Ness, because broad grants of judicial power are 
impermissibly vague and therefore violate principles of due process.176 
Minnesota Statute § 629.75 fails to provide adequate standards and 
restrictions on its application because it does not contain explicit provisions 
governing how the statute should be interpreted.177 As a result, the DANCO 
statute unjustly encroaches upon defendants’ constitutionally protected 
liberties.178 Additional safeguards are needed in order to protect criminal 
defendants’ liberties from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the 
law.179  
The Minnesota Supreme Court glossed over the issue of vagueness 
in Ness, relying on the statute’s “immediately following” language and 
                                                          
172 See supra text accompanying notes 83–87 (discussing the differences between 
facial and as-applied constitutional challenges). 
173 See supra text accompanying note 85 (stating that in an as-applied challenge a 
defendant must show that a generally constitutional law was unconstitutionally applied to the 
defendant). 
174 See supra text accompanying note 87 (noting that as-applied challenges only 
render the law unconstitutional concerning that particular defendant’s case). 
175 See supra text accompanying note 97 (providing that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court suggested a defendant may still bring an as-applied constitutional challenge to 
determine whether that particular defendant received constitutionally sufficient notice of the 
DANCO prior to its issuance). 
176 See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (providing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Ness). 
177 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the lack of judicial 
uniformity in interpreting Minnesota’s DANCO statute). 
178 See supra notes 117, 125 and accompanying text (discussing the various 
reasons why an “immediate hearing” may not provide adequate constitutional protections for 
defendants in DANCO hearings). 
179 See supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text (providing the district court’s 
reasoning for finding that the DANCO statute was unconstitutional). 
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supplementing it with additional Minnesota procedural rules.180 In doing so, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court merely reiterated the language of the DANCO 
statute rather than explaining how the DANCO statute itself affords due 
process of law.181 Minnesota Statute § 629.75 must contain explicit standards 
independent of other procedures and standards in order to avoid being held 
unconstitutionally vague.182 
Courts should not be permitted to reconstruct statutes and 
superimpose limitations that do not exist on the face of the statute.183 Courts 
ought to interpret the statute as it is written when assessing vagueness.184 To 
be valid, the DANCO statute itself must include guidelines directing courts 
when and how to correctly apply the statute.185  
The Minnesota Supreme Court incorrectly held that the DANCO 
statute facially limits a judge’s discretion in issuing a DANCO. 186 The 
limitations provided in Minnesota Statute § 629.75, subdiv. 1 do not go far 
enough to adequately reign in judicial discretion, because those limitations 
do not effectively prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.187 The 
lack of uniformity among Minnesota’s district courts further evidences the 
DANCO statute’s ambiguous language and sweeping grant of unchecked 
judicial authority.188 The DANCO statute fails the void-for-vagueness test 
because it does not facially provide enough limitations on judicial 
discretion.189  
 
                                                          
180 See supra text accompanying notes 133–134 (describing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Ness). 
181 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s finding that the Legislature commonly gives broad grants of power to administrative 
and judicial branches that are sufficiently limited by judicial discretion). 
182 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (observing that MINN. STAT. 
§ 629.75 fails to provide any legislative guidance or standards for a district court to apply 
when determining whether to issue a DANCO). 
183 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (providing the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s finding that judicial discretion suffices to provide limitations that may not exist within 
the statute). 
184 See supra notes 127, 132and accompanying text (noting that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the DANCO could not be held procedurally invalid because it could 
be constitutionally applied in one set of facts; therefore, it is “inappropriate to speculate 
regarding other hypothetical circumstances that might arise”). 
185 See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (providing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Ness). 
186 See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s holding that the void-for-vagueness doctrine did not apply in Ness). 
187 See supra notes 117 and accompanying text (noting the absence of legislative 
standards and factors within the DANCO statute).  
188 See supra notes 14, 118–119 and accompanying text (observing the lack of 
uniformity among district courts in interpreting and enforcing Minnesota’s DANCO statute). 
189 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that MINN. STAT. § 629.75 
fails to provide any legislative guidance or standards for a district court to apply when 
determining whether to issue a DANCO). 
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C. Without Clear Guidance from the Minnesota Legislature, District 
Courts Will Continue to Struggle in Interpreting the DANCO Statute 
 
The absence of legislative standards and limitations within 
Minnesota Statute § 629.75 leaves too much room for judicial discretion and 
misinterpretation.190 The Minnesota legislature should amend the DANCO 
statute to include specific provisions stipulating when and how a court 
should issue a DANCO.191 Minnesota courts will continue to inconsistently 
apply Minnesota Statute § 629.75 until the statute’s vagueness is properly 
addressed.192  
 The Minnesota legislature should emulate the specificity of its OFP 
and HRO statutes when revising the DANCO statute.193 In doing so the 
legislature must break down the elements of a DANCO hearing and the 
subsequently issued DANCO.194 Additionally, the Minnesota legislature 
ought to clarify the “immediately following” language of Minnesota Statute 
§ 629.75, subdiv. 1(c) to ensure that all criminal defendants receive the same 
procedural due process.195 
 
1. The Minnesota Legislature Ought to Address the DANCO Petition 
 
The Minnesota legislature should require that a petition be filed and 
served on the defendant before a DANCO may be issued.196 This 
requirement would effectively limit the court’s discretion in issuing 
DANCOs when one is not being sought or the facts of the case do not 
necessitate the immediate issuance of a DANCO.197 Moreover, the petition 
requirement would ensure a defendant receives adequate notice of the 
DANCO prior to the DANCO proceeding.198 Explicit notice of the DANCO 
                                                          
190 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (observing the need for additional 
checks on judicial discretion in issuing DANCOs). 
191 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (comparing the provisions of MINN. 
STAT. §§ 518B.01, 609.748 with MINN. STAT. § 629.75). 
192 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (stressing the lack of uniform 
interpretation of the DANCO statute due its vague language). 
193 See supra notes 36–65 and accompanying text (outlining the various provisions 
of MINN. STAT. §§ 518B.01, 609.748). 
194 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (analyzing the three subparts of 
MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1).  
195 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (quoting MINN. STAT. § 629.75, 
subdiv. 1(c)).  
196 See supra text accompanying notes 38–40, 58–60 (discussing the procedural 
process of obtaining an OFP and an HRO). 
197 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (observing the need for additional 
checks on judicial discretion in issuing DANCOs). 
198 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (highlighting a defendant’s lack of 
advance notice and opportunity to prepare for the DANCO hearing as evidence of ineffective 
due process under Minnesota’s DANCO statute); see also supra note 74 and accompanying 
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prior to the DANCO proceeding would provide a defendant with 
constitutionally sufficient procedural due process.199  
Similarly, the Minnesota legislature ought to stipulate who may 
request a DANCO and whether a court may issue a DANCO in the absence 
of a request from the state or domestic abuse victim.200 This requirement 
would encourage uniformity among Minnesota’s district courts in the 
issuance and enforcement of DANCOs.201 In addition, it would ensure that 
district courts are not disproportionately imposing DANCOs because there 
would be an additional check on judicial discretion.202 
Further, Minnesota Statute § 629.75 should be revised to include a 
provision discussing the contents of the DANCO petition and order.203 Under 
this proposal, the petition must: (a) identify the alleged victim; (b) briefly 
recite the facts of the case; (c) provide the probable cause supporting the 
underlying criminal charges leading to the DANCO; and (d) include a 
statement from the victim indicating whether the victim supports issuing a 
DANCO.204 A detailed petition encourages defendants to seek legal advice 
prior to the DANCO proceeding.205 Additionally, it provides courts with 
sufficient information so that judges can conscientiously, rather than 
arbitrarily, determine whether or not to issue a DANCO in a particular 
matter.206 
 
2. The Minnesota Legislature Must Define the Scope of Relief Available 
 
 The Minnesota legislature must specify the scope of relief the 
DANCO statute provides.207 Without further legislative restraints, district 
courts have too much unfettered discretion allowing them to impermissibly 
                                                          
199 See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text (suggesting that separate 
notice of the DANCO proceeding would ensure effective due process). 
200 See supra notes 38–40, 58–60 and accompanying text (specifying who may 
petition for an OFP and HRO). 
201 See supra notes 14, 118–119 and accompanying text (observing the lack of 
uniformity among district courts in interpreting and enforcing Minnesota’s DANCO statute). 
202 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (stating that a statute must contain 
minimal guidelines to govern its enforcement in order for the statute to avoid being struck 
down on vagueness grounds). 
203 See supra text accompanying notes 39–40, 59–60 (listing the petition 
requirements for Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes).  
204 See supra text accompanying notes 38–40 (discussing the OFP petition 
requirements); see also supra text accompanying notes 58–60 (stating the HRO petition 
requirements). 
205 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that many criminal 
defendants are not represented by legal counsel during the DANCO proceeding). 
206 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (outlining the district court’s 
suggestions for revising MINN. STAT. § 629.75). 
207 See supra notes 45–46, 56 and accompanying text (stating the scope of relief 
provided by Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes). 
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apply the DANCO statute.208 Revising Minnesota Statute § 629.75 to 
stipulate the scope of relief permitted under the statute will resolve the void-
for-vagueness issue by effectively minimizing judicial discretion.209  
The DANCO statute should clearly state what relief a court may 
provide in issuing a DANCO.210 Such relief should include: (a) restraining 
the defendant from committing further acts of domestic abuse against the 
alleged victim; (b) prohibiting the defendant from engaging the alleged 
victim via in person, electronic, or third party contact; and (c) excluding the 
defendant from the victim’s dwelling, place of employment, and a reasonable 
area surrounding those locations.211 Judicial relief should be limited to 
instances where the prosecutor has sufficient probable cause supporting the 
underlying criminal matter’s charges and the defendant has been provided a 
meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges and DANCO.212 Where 
immediate judicial relief is required to protect the alleged victim, the 
Minnesota legislature should provide for an ex parte DANCO to be 
temporarily issued.213 The ex parte DANCO would expire either at the 
DANCO proceeding if issued prior to the DANCO proceeding or at the 
defendant’s next scheduled court appearance if issued at the DANCO 
proceeding.214 This would allow the victim to receive immediate judicial 
protection while ensuring that the defendant is not indefinitely deprived of 
his constitutionally protected rights.215 
 
3. The Minnesota Legislature Should Clarify the DANCO Proceeding 
 
 The Minnesota legislature ought to clarify the “immediately 
following” language of Minnesota Statute § 629.75.216 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s tortured interpretation of the DANCO statute in Ness 
illustrates the danger of giving courts too much creative license in construing 
                                                          
208 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the district court’s fear that 
the lack of legislative guidance in interpreting the DANCO statute will result in further 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of its provisions). 
209 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the void-for-vagueness 
test). 
210 See supra notes 45–46, 56 and accompanying text (describing the relief granted 
by courts in OFP and HRO hearings). 
211 See supra notes 45–46, 56 and accompanying text (noting the type of relief a 
court may grant in an OFP or HRO proceeding). 
212 See supra notes 50, 112 and accompanying text (requiring probable cause be 
established before a protective order may be issued). 
213 See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (describing the OFP ex parte 
order). 
214 See supra notes 45, 61 and accompanying text (noting the impermanent nature 
of the ex parte OFP and temporary HRO). 
215 See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of an ex 
parte order).  
216 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting the emphasis the Minnesota 
Supreme Court placed on the phrase “immediately following”).  
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and applying statutory law.217 The Minnesota legislature should explicitly 
state when, where, and how the DANCO proceeding should take place.218 
The DANCO proceeding must be independent of the underlying 
criminal matter’s hearing.219 The Minnesota legislature ought to first clarify 
whether “immediately following” means the same day as or within a 
reasonable period of time of the underlying criminal matter’s hearing.220 The 
DANCO statute should be revised to allow the DANCO proceeding to occur 
within fourteen days of the underlying criminal matter’s hearing when both 
parties agree to the delay.221 Such a delay would afford the defendant the 
opportunity to meet with legal counsel, review the DANCO petition, 
summon witnesses, and present evidence in his defense.222 An ex parte 
DANCO could be issued to protect the victim and prohibit the defendant 
from contacting the victim prior to the DANCO proceeding.223  
These revisions to Minnesota Statute § 629.75 will ensure the 
independence of the DANCO proceedings from the underlying criminal 
matter and redirect courts to focus on the DANCO proceeding itself when 
analyzing issues of due process.224 
 
4. The Minnesota Legislature Should Specify the Circumstances 
Prompting a DANCO 
 
Finally, the Minnesota legislature ought to specify under what 
circumstances a DANCO may be issued, modified, lifted, or terminated.225 
The DANCO statute should explicitly address the factors for a court to 
consider in determining whether to issue a DANCO.226 These factors should 
                                                          
217 See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text (explaining the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in upholding the constitutionality of MINN. STAT. § 629.75, 
subdiv. 1). 
218 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (highlighting the inadequacies of 
Minnesota’s DANCO statute). 
219 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (emphasizing the independence of 
the DANCO proceeding from the underlying criminal matter’s hearing). 
220 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the need for additional 
legislative guidance in interpreting MINN. STAT. § 629.75). 
221 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (stating that an OFP judicial hearing 
must occur within fourteen days of the petition being filed with the court).  
222 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (stressing a defendant’s lack of 
advance notice and opportunity to prepare for the DANCO hearing as evidence of the 
ineffective process provided for under the DANCO statute).  
223 See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of an OFP 
ex parte order). 
224 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the interconnectedness 
between the DANCO statute and other statutory provisions). 
225 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that Minnesota’s OFP and 
HRO statutes have provisions regarding the modification and termination of these civil 
protective orders).  
226 See supra notes 50, 63 and accompanying text (addressing the factors courts 
should consider in determining whether to issue an OFP or HRO). 
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include: (a) the facts of the case; (b) the weight of the evidence against the 
defendant; (c) the defendant’s criminal record; (d) the seriousness of the 
alleged offense; (e) the threat posed by contact with the victim; and (f) the 
preferences of the victim.227 
Additionally, the DANCO statute should stipulate under what 
circumstances a DANCO may be modified.228 The Minnesota legislature 
should establish a uniform process for courts to follow when modifying or 
lifting the terms of an existing DANCO.229 Further, Minnesota Statute 
§ 629.75 ought to be revised to address when a pretrial DANCO expires or 
otherwise ceases to exist.230 DANCOs should be valid for a period of two 
years or until the final disposition of the underlying criminal matter, 
whichever occurs first.231 Uncertainties and inconsistencies among courts 
will continue unless the DANCO statute explicitly addresses the procedural 
processes surrounding the enforcement of DANCOs.232 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Ness creates troubling 
precedent for the future of criminal defendants’ rights in Minnesota DANCO 
proceedings.233 Further legislative guidance is needed before Minnesota’s 
courts are able to homogenously interpret and apply Minnesota Statute 
§ 629.75.234 Until then, Minnesota’s legal professionals must be diligent in 
strictly enforcing the DANCO statute’s express language, while also 
supporting as-applied constitutional challenges, so as to ensure criminal 
defendants are afforded their constitutionally protected due process rights.235  
  
                                                          
227 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (listing the factors of Minn. R. 
Crim. P. 6.02, subdiv. 2).  
228 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (stating that a DANCO may be 
modified by a subsequent court order). 
229 See supra notes 45, 118 and accompanying text (noting that an OFP may be 
judicially modified at a later hearing). 
230 See supra notes 45, 51 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations 
Minnesota’s OFP statute imposes on judicial relief). 
231 See supra notes 45, 51 and accompanying text (noting that OFPs are only 
effective for two years from the issuance date unless otherwise stipulated by the court).  
232 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the detailed procedural 
processes included in Minnesota’s OFP and HRO statutes).  
233 See supra notes 82, 97, 136 and accompanying text (noting that Ness has 
negative implications on the future of facial constitutional challenges brought against MINN. 
STAT. § 629.75 on due process grounds). 
234 See supra notes 13–15, 135–138 and accompanying text (discussing the need 
for the Minnesota legislature to revise the current DANCO statute). 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 183–185 (criticizing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of MINN. STAT. § 629.75, subdiv. 1). 
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